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“TRAPped” IN A PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY: HOW 
ABORTION RESTRICTIONS DURING THE COVID-19 
PANDEMIC MIRROR EARLIER ATTACKS ON THE ABORTION 
RIGHT AND HOW JUDICIAL REVIEW FAILED TO PROTECT IT 
NANCY L. DORDAL* 
 
In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, states issued emergency orders 
postponing certain medical procedures to curb the spread of the virus and to 
preserve medical equipment and hospital capacity.1  Several states included 
abortion procedures in these orders.2  Though all federal district courts 
enjoined enforcement of the executive orders as applied to abortions, the 
federal circuit courts split: some agreed with the district courts, but two 
circuits issued mandamus relief to uphold the temporary abortion bans.3  In 
their analyses of the constitutionality of such abortion bans, the United States 
Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eighth Circuits invoked Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts4 as a new and looser framework for constitutional analysis.5  
This Comment will argue that the purportedly temporary abortion bans 
mirror earlier attacks on the abortion right and that the two circuit courts 
improperly applied the Jacobson framework when analyzing these orders.6   
Sections I.A and I.B will trace the Supreme Court’s abortion rights 
jurisprudence.7  Section I.C will explain the framework of constitutional 
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 1. See infra Section I.D.  
 2. See infra Section I.D. 
 3. See infra Section I.D. 
 4. 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
 5. See infra Section I.D.2. 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. See infra Sections I.A–B. 
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analysis during a public emergency.8  Sections I.D and I.E will explore 
litigation relating to abortion access during the COVID-19 pandemic, 
including how courts have approached states’ use of emergency orders to ban 
abortions.9  Section II.A will articulate how federal courts have incorrectly 
upheld state emergency orders, as applied to abortions, using the Jacobson 
framework.10  Section II.B will explore how these orders, as applied to 
abortions, resemble earlier attacks on abortion rights.11  Lastly, Section II.C 
will contemplate how the reasoning employed by the federal courts in these 
cases may implicate abortion jurisprudence down the line, both during the 
pandemic and afterwards.12  
I. BACKGROUND 
The Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence has developed 
significantly over the past fifty years, and it is vital to understand this body 
of law as the backdrop for challenges to the constitutionality of abortion 
during a pandemic.13  Section I.A explores the landmark case, Roe v. Wade,14 
and the subsequent abortion case of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey.15  Section I.B traces the development of the Court’s 
abortion jurisprudence into the twenty-first century.16  Section I.C provides 
context for the role of judicial review during a public emergency.17  Section 
I.D examines how the courts have responded to state orders postponing non-
emergency medical procedures as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic as 
applied to abortions.18  Finally, Section I.E discusses other abortion litigation 
during the COVID-19 pandemic relating to in-person requirements for 
medication abortions.19 
A. Early Abortion Caselaw: Roe and Casey 
In the landmark case Roe v. Wade, the Court held that the constitutional 
right to privacy includes a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy.20  The 
 
 8. See infra Section I.C. 
 9. See infra Sections I.D–E. 
 10. See infra Section II.A. 
 11. See infra Section II.B. 
 12. See infra Section II.C. 
 13. See infra Part II.  
 14. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 15. 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see infra Section I.A. 
 16. See infra Section I.B. 
 17. See infra Section I.C. 
 18. See infra Section I.D. 
 19. See infra Section I.E. 
 20. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
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Court qualified its decision, however, based on the gestational period of the 
woman’s pregnancy.21  Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun doubted the 
strength of the relationship between the Court’s articulation of the privacy 
right and an absolute right to bodily autonomy,22 relying on Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts23 and Buck v. Bell.24  In addition to the woman’s interest in 
bodily autonomy, the Court recognized two other “separate and distinct” 
interests at stake: (1) the state’s interest in protecting the woman’s health and 
(2) the state’s interest in protecting the potentiality of human life.25  In 
balancing these three competing interests, the Court adopted a trimester 
framework for constitutional analysis.26  Critically, the Court concluded that 
the state’s interests in protecting the health of the pregnant woman and the 
potentiality of human life become compelling27 at the point the fetus becomes 
viable.28  After the viability point is reached, states may regulate abortion, 
except where an abortion is necessary to protect the life of the pregnant 
woman.29 
Justice Stewart concurred, noting that the constitutional right to privacy, 
though not fully explained by Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion, is 
implicated by the liberty interests guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of 
Fourteenth Amendment.30  Then-Associate Justice Rehnquist disputed the 
right to an abortion as a fundamental right altogether31 and criticized the 
Court’s use of the compelling state interest test, a test Rehnquist believed was 
limited to Equal Protection questions, in its Due Process analysis.32 
Another crucial case in the Court’s abortion jurisprudence came in 1992 
with the fractured opinion of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
 
 21. Id. at 154. 
 22. Id.  
 23. 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (limiting the right to bodily autonomy in the context of the smallpox 
epidemic); see also infra Section I.C.  
 24. 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (holding that a Virginia statute mandating sterilization of certain types 
of disabled people was constitutional).  
 25. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. 
 26. Id. at 163.  During the first trimester, the woman’s right to bodily autonomy dominates.  Id. 
at 162–63.  At this stage of a pregnancy, an abortion is generally safer than carrying a fetus to term, 
so, according to the Court, the state’s interest in protecting the woman’s health is not yet compelling.  
Id. at 163.  Nor is the state’s interest in protecting the potentiality of human life yet compelling, as 
the fetus is not yet viable.  Id.  The analysis changes during the second trimester, according to the 
Roe Court.  Id.  
 27. Id. at 163. 
 28. The point of viability, or the point at which a fetus could survive outside of the womb, is 
around twenty-four weeks, according to the Court.  Id. at 160. 
 29. Id. at 163–64. 
 30. Id. at 170 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 31. Id. at 177 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 32. Id. at 173. 
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Pennsylvania v. Casey.33  Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter jointly 
wrote the controlling opinion.34  The majority clarified that the right to 
terminate a pregnancy stems from the substantive component of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.35  The Court nominally upheld 
Roe, but in their plurality opinion, Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter 
rejected Roe’s trimester framework outright, characterizing it as legislating 
from the bench.36  Instead, the plurality focused the opinion solely on 
viability.37   
The plurality adopted an “undue burden” standard in place of strict 
scrutiny for analyzing abortion restrictions.38  According to the plurality, an 
undue burden is one in which the “state regulation has the purpose or effect 
of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion 
of a nonviable fetus.”39  This test balances the woman’s liberty interest with 
the state’s interests in protecting the woman’s health and preserving the 
potentiality of life.40  Applying the undue burden test, the Court ultimately 
upheld four of the five challenged restrictions,41 characterizing only the law’s 
requirement that married women notify their husbands of their intended 
abortions as an undue burden.42   
 
 33. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 34. Id. at 843.  Only Parts I, II, III, V-A, V-C and VI constitute a majority.  Id. at 843–44. 
 35. Id. at 846.  
 36. Id. at 872–73 (plurality opinion) (“A framework of this rigidity was unnecessary and in its 
later interpretation sometimes contradicted the State’s permissible exercise of its powers. . . . We 
reject the trimester framework, which we do not consider to be part of the essential holding of 
Roe.”).  The Court defined the three-part central holding of Roe as: (1) women have the right to 
abort a non-viable fetus without undue state interference; (2) states may restrict abortion once the 
viability point has been reached, as long as the restrictions do not prohibit abortions necessary to 
protect the life or health of the pregnant woman; and (3) for the duration of the pregnancy, the state’s 
interests in protecting the health of the pregnant woman and preserving the fetus’s potentiality of 
life are legitimate.  Id. at 846. 
 37. Id. at 878. 
 38. Id. at 876.  Justice O’Connor had previously articulated this standard in her dissent in City 
of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health.  462 U.S. 416, 462–63 (1983) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
 39. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (plurality opinion). 
 40. Id. at 877–78. 
 41. This case concerned five provisions of Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control Act of 1982.  Id. 
at 844 (majority opinion).  The Court upheld the following four provisions: (1) that a woman seeking 
an abortion must give informed consent; (2) that a woman seeking an abortion receive certain state-
published information at least twenty-four hours before undergoing the procedure, effectively 
creating a twenty-four-hour delay; (3) that a minor seeking an abortion must first obtain the 
informed consent of her parents or a judge; and (4) that abortion providers comply with certain 
records and reporting requirements.  Id. at 887, 895, 899, 901. 
 42. Id. at 895.  Justice Stevens defended Roe’s trimester framework and preferred a broader 
undue burden test.  Id. at 914 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice Stevens 
additionally would have held the provision requiring pregnant women seeking an abortion to wait 
twenty-four hours while considering state-published information unconstitutional.  Id. at 918.  
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B.  Abortion Rights Analysis in the Twenty-First Century 
After Casey, the Court’s abortion jurisprudence primarily concerned 
specific restrictions on abortion, rather than the existence of the right to have 
one at all.43  In Stenberg v. Carhart,44 the Supreme Court struck down a 
Nebraska law that imposed criminal penalties on physicians conducting 
dilation and evacuation (“D&E”) abortions45 as a violation of a woman’s 
right to an abortion as articulated in Roe and Casey.46  Lawmakers began 
facing public pressure to ban intact D&E abortions after a physician’s 
description of the procedure circulated into the political sphere.47  
Subsequently, Congress passed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 
which imposed criminal penalties on doctors who intentionally performed 
intact D&E procedures.48  The Act did not include an exception in cases 
where an intact D&E abortion was necessary for the pregnant woman’s 
health.49   
The Court upheld the federal act in Gonzales v. Carhart, relying on 
Congress’s factual findings and language differences between the federal act 
and the Nebraska act.50  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, concluded 
 
Justice Blackmun, who authored the Court’s Roe opinion, defended Roe’s trimester framework.  Id. 
at 930 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).  
He would have applied traditional strict scrutiny in this case to invalidate all five of the challenged 
restrictions.  Id. at 934.  Chief Justice Rehnquist would have overruled Roe outright, disagreeing 
that the right to an abortion is a fundamental right encompassed in the right to privacy guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  Id. at 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part).  He criticized the Court’s adoption of a new test and instead 
would have used rational basis review to uphold each of the challenged restrictions.  Id. at 966, 979.  
Justice Scalia also rejected the existence of a constitutional right to an abortion outright.  Id. at 979 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).   
 43. See infra Section I.B. 
 44. 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
 45. There are two types of D&E procedures: standard and intact.  Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 
124, 137 (2007).  Intact D&E abortions differ from standard D&E abortions in that intact D&Es 
involve a physician “extract[ing] the fetus intact or largely intact with only a few passes” through 
the cervix.  Id. at 136.  When performing standard D&Es, on the other hand, physicians use surgical 
instruments to dismember the fetus within the uterus, which then necessitates more passes through 
the cervix than an intact D&E procedure requires.  Id.  Anti-choice advocates refer to intact D&E 
abortions as “partial-birth abortions,” a term strategically used to invoke an emotional (and political) 
response.  See id. at 170 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The term ‘partial-birth abortion’ is neither 
recognized in the medical literature nor used by physicians who perform second-trimester 
abortions.”); id. at 182 (“Ultimately, the Court admits that ‘moral concerns’ are at work, concerns 
that could yield prohibitions on any abortion.”). 
 46. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 929–30. 
 47. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 138.  As Justice Ginsburg put it, the public outcry stems from the fact 
that “a fetus that is not dismembered resembles an infant.”  Id. at 182 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 48. Id. at 140–41 (majority opinion).   
 49. Id. at 143. 
 50. Id. at 141. 
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that the law did not impose an undue burden on women seeking abortions.51  
The Court noted that its decision in Casey relied on three premises: (1) the 
Government has a legitimate interest in regulating the medical profession to 
protect the profession’s integrity;52 (2) the state has an interest in preserving 
the potentiality of the fetus’s life for the duration of the pregnancy;53 and (3) 
the state has an interest in fully informing women who might come to regret 
their choice to obtain an abortion.54  According to the Court, the act at issue 
in Gonzales furthered these legitimate governmental interests; it did not 
intentionally impose a substantial obstacle on women seeking an abortion.55  
Further, the evidence that intact D&Es were safer than standard D&Es was, 
in the Court’s view, inconclusive,56 and standard D&Es were permitted under 
the Act.57  Thus, the Court deferred to Congress, holding that the Act did not 
impose an undue burden because it did not have the effect of imposing a 
“substantial obstacle in the path of [women] seeking an abortion”58 and that 
an exception to the ban for the health of the pregnant woman was 
unnecessary.59  
 
 51. Id. at 147. 
 52. Id. at 157. 
 53. Id. at 158. 
 54. Id. at 159–60. 
 55. Id. at 160. 
 56. Id. at 163. 
 57. Id. at 164.  But see id. at 180 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (highlighting the consensus by 
medical authorities with relevant training that an intact D&E was, in fact, sometimes the safest 
procedure); id. at 181–82 (noting that the majority’s reasoning does not protect standard D&E 
procedures from condemnation and regulation, as the majority claims it does, because both types of 
procedures are “‘brutal’”). 
 58. Id. at 156 (majority opinion) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992)). 
 59. Id. at 166.  Justice Thomas concurred but wrote separately to “reiterate [his] view that the 
Court’s abortion jurisprudence, including Casey and Roe v. Wade, has no basis in the Constitution.”  
Id. at 169 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).  Justice Ginsburg characterized the 
majority’s decision as an “alarming” misapplication of the Casey and Stenberg precedents because 
those cases, she noted, require that post-viability regulations of abortion protect the pregnant 
woman’s health.  Id. at 170 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  This law, she wrote, “saves not a single fetus 
from destruction, for it targets only a method of performing abortion.”  Id. at 181.  She also 
highlighted that Congress—and the majority—ignored the overwhelming consensus in the relevant 
medical field that intact D&E abortions were sometimes medically necessary.  Id. at 180 (“The 
Court acknowledges some of this evidence . . . , but insists that, because some witnesses disagreed 
with [the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists] and other experts’ assessment of 
risk, the Act can stand. . . . In this instance, the Court brushes under the rug the District Courts’ 
well-supported findings that the physicians who testified that intact D&E is never necessary to 
preserve the health of a woman had slim authority for their opinions.  They had no training for, or 
personal experience with, the intact D&E procedure, and many performed abortions only on rare 
occasions.”). 
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In 2016, the Court again visited the undue burden test in Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.60  There, the Court, with Justice Breyer 
writing for the majority, struck down two Texas laws, concluding that both 
imposed substantial obstacles on women seeking previability abortions 
without sufficient medical benefits to justify the laws, thereby imposing 
undue burdens on women trying to access abortions.61  The first law required 
abortion providers to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty 
miles of the site where the abortion took place.62  The second law required 
abortion facilities to meet the standards required of ambulatory surgical 
centers.63  Justice Breyer clarified that under the Casey undue burden test, 
courts must “consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together 
with the benefits those laws confer.”64  Because “there was no significant 
health-related problem that the new [admitting-privileges] law helped cure,” 
there was no benefit to the law.65  And because the law had the effect of 
shuttering a dramatic number of existing abortion facilities,66 the law 
imposed a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion.67  
Weighing the lack of benefits against the imposed obstacle, the Court 
concluded that the admitting privileges requirement posed an undue burden 
in violation of the Constitution.68  Likewise, the Court deemed the surgical 
center requirement an undue burden in violation of the Constitution because 
the heightened standard was unnecessary, did not benefit patients seeking 
abortions,69 and posed a substantial obstacle to women seeking abortions by 
reducing the number of abortion facilities in the state to single digits.70 
 
 60. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).   
 61. Id. at 2300. 
 62. Id.  Requirements that an abortion provider have admitting privileges purport to “ensure 
that women have easy access to a hospital should complications arise during an abortion procedure.”  
Id. at 2311.  But there is little evidence that such admitting privileges are necessary because 
complications from abortions are rare, and even when complications do arise, they very rarely 
manifest during an actual procedure.  Id.  
 63. Id. at 2300.  Ambulatory surgical center requirements include, inter alia, detailed spatial 
dimensions, in-office traffic patterns, staffing requirements, and HVAC requirements.  Id. at 2314–
15. 
 64. Id. at 2309. 
 65. Id. at 2311. 
 66. Id. at 2312. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 2313. 
 69. Id. at 2315. 
 70. Id. at 2316.  Justice Ginsburg concurred to emphasize that abortions are often safer than 
carrying a fetus to term and that restrictions on abortion most adversely affect vulnerable women.  
Id. at 2320 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).  Justice Thomas criticized the Court’s articulation of the 
undue burden standard as a balancing test of the burdens and benefits of an abortion restriction and 
the Court’s conferral of third-party standing on the abortion providers.  Id. at 2321–22 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).  He characterized the majority opinion as emblematic of just how “unworkable” the 
Court’s third-party standing and tiers of scrutiny analyses are.  Id. at 2328.  In Justice Alito’s view, 
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Justice Breyer further clarified the undue burden standard in the recent 
June Medical Services LLC v. Russo plurality opinion.71  He explained that 
the undue burden test requires courts to independently examine legislative 
findings and weigh the benefits of an abortion law as compared to its 
burdens.72  The Court thus struck down a Louisiana statute that “is almost 
word-for-word identical to Texas’s admitting-privileges law,”73 concluding 
the law was an undue burden—and therefore unconstitutional—because it 
imposed a substantial obstacle for women seeking an abortion without any 
health benefit for the pregnant women.74 
Chief Justice Roberts concurred in the judgment, achieving a five-
Justice majority to strike down the law.75  The Chief Justice based his 
decision on a substantial obstacle test, believing that Whole Woman’s Health 
was wrongly decided but still respecting it as precedent under stare decisis.76  
His test eliminates the balancing that the plurality’s test—the test articulated 
by the majority in Whole Woman’s Health—requires.77   
C.  Framework for Constitutional Analysis During a Public Emergency 
The Supreme Court has long recognized states’ authority to regulate the 
public’s health and safety through their inherent police powers.78  Historically 
in public emergencies, including pandemics, states broaden the use of this 
 
not enough women of reproductive age in Texas were affected by these provisions for them to be 
considered an undue burden and that there was not enough evidence to conclude that these 
provisions had a material impact on access to abortion.  Id. at 2343, 2346 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 71. 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020).  There currently is a circuit split on which test—the undue burden 
test or substantial obstacle test—is controlling.  Compare Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & 
Gynecologists v. FDA, 472 F. Supp. 3d 183, 209 (D. Md. 2020) (holding that the Whole Woman’s 
Health undue burden test remained the correct standard because the June Medical plurality and 
Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence in the judgment did not share a “common denominator” 
regarding the appropriate standard), with Hopkins v. Jegley, 968 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2020) 
(holding that the substantial obstacle test, favored by Chief Justice Roberts, is the appropriate test 
because Chief Justice Roberts’s June Medical concurrence in the judgment was necessary to achieve 
a majority).  June Medical was decided on June 29, 2020, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic 
and after the cases challenging state executive orders discussed below.  However, the decision is 
still vitally important for understanding how abortion rights jurisprudence might develop in the 
future, especially with the marked shift in the ideological makeup of the Supreme Court with Justice 
Barrett replacing Justice Ginsburg.  See 166 CONG. REC. S6588 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2020) 
(confirming the nomination of Amy Coney Barrett to be the Supreme Court).  
 72. June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2112 (citing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165 (2007)). 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 2112–13. 
 75. Id. at 2133 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment).  
 76. Id.   
 77. Id. at 2135–36.  Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh each wrote separate 
dissents.  See id. at 2142 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2153 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2171 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting); id. at 2182 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 78. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905). 
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power.79  In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Court held that a Massachusetts 
law requiring compliance with local ordinances mandating vaccination 
against smallpox was constitutional.80  The Court explained that a state’s 
police powers contain authority to enact reasonable regulations to ensure the 
public’s health and safety and “to enact quarantine laws and health laws of 
every description.”81  The regulations and rules adopted under a state’s police 
powers, however, are still subject to the Constitution and “must always yield” 
where a state’s police powers conflict with the Constitution’s grant of federal 
authority or its conferral of an individual right.82  The Court noted that 
individual rights are not absolute; the state is free to reasonably restrict such 
rights if the public good so requires.83  
Though the federal government must give deference to the states’ police 
powers, the Court emphasized that there may be circumstances where a 
state’s rules and regulations relating to a public health emergency could be 
unreasonable enough to warrant judicial interference.84  Most importantly, 
the Jacobson Court held that judicial review during a public health crisis was 
limited to those state and local rules that nominally protect public health and 
safety, but that, in reality, have “no real or substantial relation to those 
objects” or are “a plain, palpable invasion of rights” conferred by the 
Constitution.85  Before the COVID-19 pandemic, courts primarily cited 
Jacobson to uphold a state’s use of its police power in instances where a state 
mandated that individuals suspected of carrying infectious diseases 
quarantine86 and where a state required vaccinations for public school 
children.87 
 
 79. See infra Section I.C. 
 80. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31. 
 81. Id. at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. at 26. 
 84. Id. at 28. 
 85. Id. at 31.   
 86. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Siegel v. Shinnick, 219 F. Supp. 789 (E.D.N.Y. 1963) 
(involving smallpox); Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579 (D.N.J. 2016) (involving Ebola); 
Reynolds v. McNichols, 488 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1973) (involving venereal disease).   
 87. See, e.g., Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922) (holding that Jacobson settled that a 
state’s police power does, in fact, encompass mandatory vaccination regimes); Phillips v. City of 
New York, 775 F.3d 538, 542 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that Jacobson barred substantive due process 
challenges to New York’s mandatory vaccine requirement for public school children); Workman v. 
Mingo Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 419 F. App’x 348, 353–54 (4th Cir. 2011) (relying on Jacobson in 
holding that West Virginia’s mandatory vaccine requirement for public school children was not 
unconstitutional).  Courts have also given deference to states using their police powers in other 
emergency situations like hurricanes.  Smith v. Avino, 91 F.3d 105, 109 (11th Cir. 1996), abrogated 
on other grounds by Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998).  For example, 
in 1992, Florida residents challenged a curfew put in place by county officials after the governor 
declared a state of emergency in the wake of Hurricane Andrew.  Id. at 108.  The challengers claimed 
that the curfew infringed on their constitutional right to travel.  Id. at 107.  The United States Court 
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D.  State Executive Orders and Abortion During the COVID-19 
Pandemic 
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic,88 state governors across the 
country issued executive orders postponing non-emergency medical 
procedures to preserve hospital capacity and personal protective equipment 
(“PPE”) and to curtail spread of the virus.89  Violations of some of these 
orders carried criminal penalties.90  Abortion providers in Ohio, Tennessee, 
Oklahoma, Alabama, Texas, and Arkansas brought suit in their respective 
jurisdictions to limit the scope of their state’s executive order to exclude 
abortions.91  In each case, the relevant federal district court temporarily 
enjoined enforcement of the order as applied to abortion procedures.92  Three 
federal circuits—the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh—ultimately let the district 
courts’ rulings stand.93  The Fifth and Eighth Circuits, however, issued 
mandamus relief to effectively overrule the district courts in their 
jurisdictions.94 
 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ultimately held that the curfew was constitutional, relying on 
precedential cases that have “consistently held it is a proper exercise of police power to respond to 
emergency situations with temporary curfews that might curtail the movement of persons who 
otherwise would enjoy freedom from restriction.”  Id. at 109.  More generally, the Eleventh Circuit 
noted that in emergency situations, “governing authorities must be granted the proper deference and 
wide latitude necessary for dealing with the emergency.”  Id. 
 88. COVID-19, the serious respiratory disease caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus, rapidly 
spread across the United States (and the world) in the spring of 2020 through person-to-person 
transmission.  Preterm-Cleveland v. Att’y Gen., 456 F. Supp. 3d 917, 920 (S.D. Ohio 2020).  Efforts 
to curb infections of COVID-19 include maintaining at least a six-foot distance from other 
individuals and, especially for healthcare workers, donning personal protective equipment (“PPE”) 
like masks, face shield, and gloves.  Id.  As the virus gained traction in the United States, healthcare 
facilities faced a shortage of such PPE.  Id. 
 89. Pre-Term Cleveland v. Att’y Gen., No. 20-3365, 2020 WL 1673310, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 6, 
2020); Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913, 918 (6th Cir. 2020); S. Wind Women’s Ctr. 
LLC v. Stitt, 808 F. App’x 677, 679 (10th Cir. 2020); Robinson v. Att’y Gen., 957 F.3d 1171, 1174 
(11th Cir. 2020); In re Abbott (Abbott II), 954 F.3d 772, 777 (5th Cir. 2020); In re Rutledge, 956 
F.3d 1018, 1023 (8th Cir. 2020). 
 90. See, e.g., Slatery, 956 F.3d at 919; Planned Parenthood Ctr. for Choice v. Abbott (Abbott 
III), No. A-20-CV-323-LY, 2020 U.S. Dist. WL 1815587, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2020) (noting 
the criminal penalties for violating the respective state emergency order), vacated in part sub nom. 
In re Abbott (Abbott VI), 956 F.3d 696 (5th Cir. 2020). 
 91. Pre-Term Cleveland, 2020 WL 1673310, at *1; Slatery, 956 F.3d at 919; Stitt, 808 F. App’x 
at 680; Robinson, 957 F. 3d at 1175; Planned Parenthood Ctr. for Choice v. Abbott (Abbott I), 450 
F. Supp. 3d 753, 755 (W.D. Tex. 2020); Rutledge, 956 F.3d at 1025. 
 92. Preterm-Cleveland, 456 F. Supp. 3d at 939; Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 455 F. Supp. 
3d. 619, 629 (M.D. Tenn. 2020), aff’d as modified, 956 F.3d 913 (6th Cir. 2020); S. Wind Women’s 
Ctr. LLC v. Stitt, 455 F. Supp. 3d 1219, 1231 (W.D. Okla. 2020); Robinson v. Marshall, 454 F. 
Supp. 3d 1188, 1206 (M.D. Ala. 2020); Abbott III, 2020 WL 1815587, at *7; Little Rock Fam. Plan. 
Servs. v. Rutledge, 454 F. Supp. 3d 821, 834–35 (E.D. Ark. 2020), order vacated in part, No. 4:19-
cv-00449, 2020 WL 2079224 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 22, 2020). 
 93. See infra Section I.D.1. 
 94. See infra Section I.D.2. 
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1.  Some Jurisdictions Limited the Scope of State Executive Orders, 
Rendering Them Inapplicable to Abortion Procedures.  
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits each upheld their respective district courts’ enjoinment of the 
respective state executive orders as applied to abortion procedures.95 
i. Sixth Circuit  
On  March 17, 2020, the Ohio Department of Health issued an order 
postponing all non-emergency procedures that required PPE use and 
imposing criminal sanctions on those who disobeyed the order.96  On March 
20 and 21, Ohio officials sent abortion providers letters threatening to take 
action if the providers did not cease performing abortions in compliance with 
the order.97  The providers brought suit, seeking a temporary restraining order 
(“TRO”),98 which the district court partially granted about ten days later.99  
When Ohio moved to stay the TRO pending appeal, the Sixth Circuit held 
that it lacked jurisdiction over the State’s interlocutory appeal.100  The district 
court’s injunction as applied to abortion procedures remained intact—
meaning abortions in Ohio could continue as usual.101   
The Sixth Circuit later issued a similar opinion on a second case arising 
out of an analogous state order from Tennessee.102  In holding that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in enjoining the Tennessee executive order, 
the court noted that absent a pandemic, the executive order’s three-week 
prohibition on procedural abortions103 would clearly constitute a substantial 
 
 95. See infra Sections I.D.1.i–iii. 
 96. Pre-Term Cleveland v. Att’y Gen., No. 20-3365, 2020 WL 1673310, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 6, 
2020). 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at *2.  
 101. Id. 
 102. Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913, 918 (6th Cir. 2020).  On April 8, 2020, 
Governor Lee of Tennessee issued an executive order postponing all “surgical and invasive 
procedures that are elective and non-urgent” until the order expired on April 30.  Id. (quoting Tenn. 
Exec. Order No. 25 (April 8, 2020), https://publications.tnsosfiles.com/pub/execorders/exec-orders-
lee25.pdf).  The order did not allow health professionals to perform procedures that, in their 
professional judgment, would not counteract the executive order’s purpose.  Id. at 918–19.  Abortion 
providers challenged the executive order on substantive due process grounds as applied specifically 
to procedural abortions because the parties in this case stipulated that the executive order did not 
apply to medication abortions.  Id. at 919–20.  State officials conceded that the order imposed 
criminal penalties on abortion providers who performed procedural abortions during the three-week 
duration of the executive order, except in extreme circumstances.  Id. at 919.   
 103. Procedural abortions, also referred to as surgical abortions, include aspiration abortions 
(where the embryo or fetus is sucked out of the uterus through the cervix using a vacuum) and D&E 
abortions, both of which take place in out-patient clinical settings.  Id. at 917.  Medication abortions, 
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obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion and would therefore be 
unconstitutional as an undue burden under Casey.104  Under the Jacobson 
framework, the court reasoned, the executive order, for some women at least, 
“constitute[d] ‘beyond question a plain, palpable invasion’” of their 
fundamental right to a previability abortion, despite the deference afforded to 
Tennessee.105  The court did, however, limit the scope of the preliminary 
injunction.106  Almost a year later, the Supreme Court summarily granted 
certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded to the Sixth Circuit to vacate 
its expired order granting the preliminary injunction as moot.107 
ii.  Tenth Circuit 
Similarly, Governor Kevin Stitt of Oklahoma issued an executive order 
on March 24, 2020, mandating the delay of  “all elective surgeries, minor 
medical procedures, and non-emergency dental procedures,”108  including all 
abortions not specifically defined as a medical emergency by Oklahoma 
statute or abortions not necessary to preserve the pregnant woman’s life.109  
The district court enjoined enforcement of the executive order as it pertained 
to all medication abortions and all surgical abortions for patients who would 
be unable to obtain a legal abortion before the expiration of the executive 
order.110  In a per curiam opinion, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the state 
officials’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction.111   
 
used in the earliest weeks of a pregnancy, involve ingesting medications that shed the uterine lining 
to end the pregnancy.  Medical Versus Surgical Abortion, UNIV. OF CAL., SAN FRANCISCO HEALTH, 
https://www.ucsfhealth.org/education/medical-versus-surgical-abortion. 
 104. Slatery, 956 F.3d at 929.  Specifically, the Sixth Circuit held (1) that the abortion providers 
were likely to succeed on the merits of their substantive due process claim; (2) that the abortion 
providers and their patients were likely to suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction were 
not granted; (3) that the balance of equities weighs in the abortion providers’ favor; and (4) that the 
injunction is in the public interest.  Id. at 924, 927–29. 
 105. Id. at 926 (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905)). 
 106. Id. at 929–30.  The court limited the order’s application to only the three categories of 
women who would be adversely affected by the executive order: (1) women who would likely be 
unable to obtain an abortion at all if their procedures were delayed until the expiration of the 
executive order; (2) women who would likely face more intrusive procedures if their procedures 
were delayed until the expiration of the executive order; and (3) women who would likely 
specifically have to undergo a two-day procedure if their procedures were delayed until the 
expiration of the executive order.  Id. 
 107. Slatery v. Adams & Boyle, P.C., 141 S. Ct. 1262, 1263 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2021), vacating as 
moot 956 F.3d 913 (6th Cir. 2020). 
 108. S. Wind Women’s Ctr. LLC v. Stitt, 808 F. App’x 677, 679 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Okla. 
Exec. Order 2020-07, Am. No. 4, ¶ 18).  The executive order initially imposed a deadline of April 
7, 2020, but it was later extended to April 30.  Id.  
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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iii.  Eleventh Circuit  
Alabama issued a similar order postponing all medical procedures that 
were not immediately medically necessary because of an emergency for 
several weeks.112  Abortion providers sought confirmation that their clinics 
would not be subject to the order.113  Alabama officials vacillated on their 
interpretation of the scope of the order, so the district court granted the 
abortion providers a preliminary injunction, enjoining the enforcement of the 
order as applied to abortion providers who, in their professional medical 
judgment, believed their patients must go forward with their abortion 
procedures or else lose their legal rights.114  Relying on Jacobson, the 
Eleventh Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
enjoining enforcement of the order.115  The court noted that, within the 
Jacobson framework, neither the individual’s right to terminate a pregnancy 
nor the state’s police powers were unlimited.116   
2.  Other Jurisdictions Maintained the Restrictions on Abortion. 
Other circuits took different approaches.  Though both district courts in 
Texas and Arkansas enjoined enforcement of their respective state’s 
executive order as applied to abortions, both the Fifth and Eighth Circuits 
used mandamus relief to effectively overrule the district courts.117 
i. Fifth Circuit  
Like the governors mentioned above, Texas Governor Greg Abbott 
issued executive order GA-09 on March 22, 2020, postponing non-essential 
medical procedures,118 which the state interpreted to include limitations on 
 
 112. Robinson v. Att’y Gen., 957 F.3d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2020).  After Governor Kay Ivey 
of Alabama declared a state of emergency on March 13, 2020, the Alabama State Health Officer 
issued an order on March 27, 2020.  Id.  The order was initially active until April 17, 2020 but was 
later extended until April 30, 2020.  Id.  
 113. Id. at 1174–75. 
 114. Id. at 1176. 
 115. Id. at 1174, 1179. 
 116. Id. at 1179–80. 
 117. See infra Sections I.D.2.i–ii. 
 118. Abbott II, 954 F.3d 772, 777 (5th Cir. 2020).  The order postponed “all surgeries and 
procedures that are not immediately medically necessary to correct a serious medical condition of, 
or to preserve the life of, a patient who without immediate performance of the surgery or procedure 
would be at risk for serious adverse medical consequences or death, as determined by the patient’s 
physician” until April 21, 2020 at 11:59 PM.  Tex. Exec. Order No. GA-09 (Mar. 22, 2020), 
https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/press/EO-GA_09_COVID-19_hospital_capacity_IMAGE_03-
22-2020.pdf.  Excepted from the order was “any procedure that, if performed in accordance with 
the commonly accepted standard of clinical practice, would not deplete the hospital capacity or the 
personal protective equipment needed to cope with the COVID-19 disaster.”  Id.  
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abortions.119  Abortion providers in the state brought suit challenging the 
executive order on substantive due process grounds.120  On March 30, the 
district court issued a TRO against the executive order as applied to abortion 
procedures.121  State officials subsequently sought an emergency stay of the 
order and a writ of mandamus—a type of relief used only in “exceptional 
circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpation of power . . . or a clear 
abuse of discretion”122—from the Fifth Circuit to vacate the district court’s 
TRO.123  The Fifth Circuit ultimately partially granted the Texas officials’ 
writ of mandamus and directed the district court to vacate the TRO,124 letting 
the temporary abortion ban stand except for one narrow exception.125  
The Fifth Circuit held that mandamus relief was warranted because the 
district court failed to follow the Fifth Circuit’s Abbott II mandate, requiring 
the district court to evaluate GA-09 within the Jacobson framework.126  The 
Fifth Circuit also held that the district court’s ruling was “patently erroneous” 
and abused its discretion for several reasons.127  It “usurped the state’s 
 
 119. Abbott II, 954 F.3d at 792 n.25. 
 120. Abbott I, 450 F. Supp. 3d 753, 755 (W.D. Tex. 2020).  On March 29, 2020, however, the 
Texas Medical Board clarified that “‘the prohibition does not apply to office-based visits without 
surgeries or procedures’” and that a “‘procedure’ does not include physical examinations, non-
invasive diagnostic tests, the performing of lab tests, or obtaining specimens to perform laboratory 
tests.”  Abbott III, No. A-20-CV-323-LY, 2020 U.S. Dist. WL 1815587, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 
2020), vacated in part sub nom. Abbott VI, 956 F.3d 696 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Texas Medical 
Board (TMB) Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) Regarding Non-Urgent Elective Surgeries and 
Procedures During Texas Disaster Declaration for COVID-19 Pandemic, TEX. MED. BD. (Mar. 29, 
2020), https://med.uth.edu/ortho/wp-content/uploads/sites/60/2020/03/TMB-COVID-19-Elective-
Surgery-FAQs-Updated-20200329.pdf). 
 121. Abbott II, 954 F.3d at 778. 
 122. Cheney v. U.S. District Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (internal quotations omitted).  
Mandamus relief can be used “to restrain a lower court when its actions would threaten the 
separation of powers by embarrass[ing] the executive arm of the Government, . . . or result in the 
intrusion by the federal judiciary on the delicate area of federal-state relations.”  Id. at 381 (alteration 
in original) (internal quotations omitted). 
 123. Abbott II, 954 F.3d at 779.  
 124. Abbott VI, 956 F.3d at 704. 
 125. The Fifth Circuit permitted the part of the April 9 TRO restraining enforcement of GA-09 
for “patients ‘who, based on the treating physician’s medical judgment, would be past the legal limit 
for an abortion in Texas—[twenty-two]-weeks LMP—on April 22, 2020.’”  Id. (quoting Abbott III, 
2020 WL 1815587, at *7). 
 126. Id. at 710. 
 127. Id. at 713.  Citing inadequacy of the record, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district 
court abused its discretion in exempting medication abortions from GA-09 for the following 
reasons: (1) the district court failed to consider PPE usage and standard of care in medication 
abortions during the pandemic (as opposed to during normal times), id. at 714; (2) the district court 
usurped state officials’ authority to enact policy to protect the public during a public health crisis, 
id. at 716; and (3) the district court failed to “carefully parse record evidence”—as mandated by 
Abbott II—and failed to cite any evidence submitted by state officials in the TRO, id. at 718.  
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authority to craft emergency public health measures,” justifying mandamus 
relief.128   
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court’s TRO patently erred 
by exempting patients who would reach eighteen weeks since their last 
menstrual period (“LMP”)129 before the expiration of GA-09 and whose 
doctors determined would be unlikely to obtain an abortion before reaching 
Texas’s twenty-two weeks LMP limitation on abortion.130  In the court’s 
view, the district court’s characterization of GA-09 as a categorical ban on 
abortion for these patients in violation of Casey was “obviously wrong.”131  
Despite hesitation, the Fifth Circuit noted that the district court did not 
patently err by exempting patients who would reach twenty-two weeks LMP 
before the expiration of GA-09.132  Lastly, the Fifth Circuit held that state 
officials had met the remaining burdens for mandamus relief, concluding that 
the state officials had no other adequate means of relief and that the 
extraordinary circumstances of this case justified mandamus as a remedy.133 
In dissent, Judge Dennis accused the majority of “simply disagree[ing] 
with the district court’s decisions on matters that are squarely within its 
discretion” and misappropriating mandamus as a form of relief.134  Judge 
Dennis emphasized that mandamus is a unique form of relief only to be used 
“in ‘exceptional circumstances,’” not merely when the appellate court 
disagrees with the lower court or even when the lower court errs.135  Because 
he and judges in other circuits reached different conclusions, Judge Dennis 
wrote that the state officials necessarily did not meet the “clear and 
indisputable” requirements for mandamus relief.136 
In the dissent’s view, there was sufficient evidence in the record for the 
district court to find that enforcement of GA-09 on all the types of abortion 
at issue was not substantially related to protecting public health and that such 
enforcement infringed on Texas patients’ constitutional right to an abortion 
 
 128. Id. at 713. 
 129. Medical professionals calculate gestational age based on how many weeks have passed 
since the first day of a patient’s last menstrual period, rather than the date of conception.  Anne 
Davis, How Doctors Date Pregnancies, Explained, REWIRE NEWS GROUP (Oct. 17, 2013, 9:12 
AM), https://rewirenewsgroup.com/article/2013/10/17/whats-in-a-week-pregnancy-dating-
standards-and-what-they-mean/. 
 130. Abbott VI, 956 F.3d. at 721. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 722. 
 133.  Id. at 723. 
 134. Abbott VI, 956 F.3d at 724 (Dennis, J., dissenting in part). 
 135. Id. at 726 (quoting Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380). 
 136. Id. (quoting Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380–81); see also supra Section I.D.1 (discussing the 
federal circuits reaching the opposite conclusion as the Fifth Circuit did here). 
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under the Jacobson framework.137  Based on the plain meaning of the 
executive order, the dissent inferred that “the enforcement against abortion 
providers more generally is pretextual and motivated by hostility to abortion 
rights.”138  The Supreme Court, nearly a year later, granted certiorari, vacated 
the judgment, and remanded the case so that the Fifth Circuit could dismiss 
the case as moot.139 
ii. Eighth Circuit 
The Eighth Circuit approached the as-applied challenges to Arkansas’s 
directive postponing non-emergency medical procedures similarly, which 
applied to surgical abortions, but not medication abortions.140  After the 
district court enjoined enforcement of the directive as applied to surgical 
abortions,141 the Eighth Circuit, relying explicitly on the Fifth Circuit’s 
Abbott II reasoning, granted Arkansas’s petition for mandamus relief.142  The 
Eighth Circuit concluded that because the abortion providers challenged the 
directive in a supplemental complaint as part of litigation already pending 
(rather than initiating new, separate litigation), the State had no other means 
of relief.143  Using reasoning similar to the Fifth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit 
maintained that the district court abused its discretion in deeming its decision 
consistent with Jacobson because it did not apply the Jacobson framework 
sufficiently, leading to “patently erroneous results.”144   
 
 137. Id. at 733–34.  The district court specifically found: (1) that suspending medication 
abortions under GA-09 does not conserve PPE nor hospital capacity and (2) that GA-09 provided 
no net benefit in prohibiting patients who would reach eighteen weeks LMP and be unlikely to 
obtain an abortion before the 22-week cutoff according to their doctors from receiving medication 
abortions.  Id. at 737–39. 
 138. Id. at 735. 
 139. Slatery v. Adams & Boyle, P.C., 141 S. Ct. 1262, 1263 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2021), vacating as 
moot 956 F.3d 913 (6th Cir. 2020). 
 140. See In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018, 1025 (8th Cir. 2020) (relying on the Fifth Circuit’s 
reasoning in Abbott II).  On March 11, 2020, Governor Asa Hutchinson of Arkansas declared a state 
of emergency and issued Executive Order 20-03, giving the Arkansas Department of Health 
authority to do “everything reasonably possible to respond to and recover from the COVID-19 
virus.”  Id. at 1023.  On April 3, 2020, the Arkansas Department of Health issued a directive 
postponing all surgeries deemed not medically necessary by a patient’s doctor.  Id.  The directive 
did not contain an expiration date but could only endure as long as the duration of the state of 
emergency, which, unless extended by the Governor, was capped at sixty days by Arkansas law.  
Id. at 1024. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. (citing Abbott II, 954 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 2020)). 
 143. Id. at 1026–27. 
 144. Id. at 1028. 
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E. Litigation Challenging Medication Abortion Requirements in the 
District of Maryland  
Abortion litigation during the COVID-19 pandemic has not only arisen 
because of state emergency orders.  Some abortion advocates have also 
brought suit challenging the requirements that, before a patient receives a 
medication abortion, the patient must sign an agreement in front of the 
prescribing physician in person and the physician must dispense the abortion-
inducing drug in person (rather than through a retail or mail-order 
pharmacy).145  On May 27, 2020, abortion providers brought suit in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Maryland to enjoin the United States Food 
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) from applying these in-person 
requirements for medication abortions during the pandemic.146  The abortion 
providers argued that such requirements unconstitutionally infringed upon 
the right to an abortion, and that the requirements violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.147  
The district court granted a nationwide preliminary injunction and, 
using the Whole Woman’s Health balancing test analysis,148 held that 
abortion providers were likely to succeed in their claim that it was 
unconstitutional to enforce in-person requirements for medication 
abortions.149  The burdens imposed by the in-person requirements, including 
difficulty travelling to an appropriate clinic and risk of infection for a 
medication abortion, constitute a substantial obstacle in the path of women 
seeking an abortion.150  The benefits of the requirement, that the doctor can 
assess and counsel the patient in person151 and that the patient is less likely to 
face a delay by receiving the medication in person,152 can be adequately 
remedied without the in-person requirements during the pandemic through 
telemedicine.153  The Fourth Circuit denied the FDA’s motion for stay 
 
 145. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. FDA, 472 F. Supp. 3d 183, 191 (D. Md. 
2020). 
 146. Id. at 197. 
 147. Id. 
 148. This district court maintained that the undue burden balancing test articulated in Whole 
Woman’s Health was the appropriate standard, even after June Medical, because, in that case, the 
plurality and Roberts’s concurrence in the judgment did not share a “common denominator” 
regarding the appropriate standard.  Id. at 209.  But see Hopkins v. Jegley, 968 F.3d 912, 915 (8th 
Cir. 2020) (holding that the constitutional standard for abortion laws going forward is a substantial 
obstacle test because Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence in the judgment was necessary to achieve 
a majority, so his opinion is controlling). 
 149. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 472 F. Supp. 3d at 224. 
 150. Id. at 216. 
 151. Id. at 219–20. 
 152. Id. at 220. 
 153. Id. at 222. 
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pending appeal on August 13, 2020.154  In January, 2021, the Supreme Court 
stayed the injunction pending disposition of the appeal in the Fourth Circuit, 
allowing the FDA to continue enforcing the in-person requirements.155  Three 
months later, the FDA changed course, announcing it would cease enforcing 
both the in-person dispensing and signature requirements for the duration of 
the pandemic.156  
II. ANALYSIS  
During the COVID-19 pandemic, states used their broad police powers 
to employ a variety of tactics to stop the spread of the virus.157  Some of these 
tactics infringed upon citizens’ civil liberties, including the right to have an 
abortion.158  As states used their emergency orders to delay abortions by 
characterizing them as “non-essential” or “elective” procedures, courts 
looked to Jacobson v. Massachusetts for guidance.159  Section II.A argues 
that federal courts improperly used the Jacobson framework both 
normatively and descriptively to uphold state emergency orders that 
temporarily banned abortion during the COVID-19 pandemic.160  Section 
II.B explores how the state orders restricting access to abortion in the name 
of public health mirror frequent anti-abortion attacks on abortion rights, like 
Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (“TRAP”) laws.161  Section II.C 
then considers how these orders and the cases upholding them as applied to 
abortions may inform how abortion rights are treated farther along in the 
pandemic or even afterwards.162  
A.  Using the Jacobson framework to suspend judicial review of 
abortion restrictions is both normatively and descriptively 
incorrect. 
Courts that both upheld and struck down temporary abortion bans 
resulting from state emergency orders all invoked Jacobson to some degree 
 
 154. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. FDA, No. 20-1824 (4th Cir. Aug. 13, 2020) 
(order denying motion for stay pending appeal). 
 155. FDA v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, No. 20A34 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2021). 
 156. Joint Motion to Hold Appeals in Abeyance 1, 7, ECF No. 103, Am. Coll. of Obstetricians 
& Gynecologists v. FDA, No. 20-1824 (4th Cir. Apr. 13, 2021). 
 157. See supra Section I.D. 
 158. See generally Jeffrey D. Jackson, Tiered Scrutiny in a Pandemic, 12 CONLAWNOW 39 
(2020) (discussing how constitutional analysis has played out with respect to other civil liberties 
like limitations on gatherings, firearms sales, religious services, and businesses). 
 159. See supra Section I.D. 
 160. See infra Section II.A. 
 161. See infra Section II.B. 
 162. See infra Section II.C. 
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in their analyses.163  Courts that upheld the abortion bans viewed Jacobson 
as granting exceptional deference to the states.164  This framework, however, 
is both normatively and descriptively incorrect.165  This sort of suspension of 
judicial review is normatively improper because the courts are a necessary 
check on the states’ exercise of police powers—including and especially 
during an emergency health crisis.166  The Jacobson framework adopted by 
these courts is also descriptively improper because Jacobson did not establish 
a different standard of judicial review.167 
1. Suspension of judicial review under the Jacobson framework is 
normatively improper. 
Since Marbury v. Madison,168 judicial review over government action 
has been a foundational aspect of constitutional analysis.169  Legal scholars, 
however, have long criticized courts’ apparent suspension of judicial review 
during times of crisis.170  Under this “suspension” model, courts apply a lower 
level of scrutiny to a constitutional challenge or only nominally apply the 
designated tier of scrutiny while in actuality applying a much less rigorous 
standard.171  Suspension of judicial review allows the government to curtail 
access to abortion with little pushback.172  When judicial review is suspended, 
the political branches do not need to be transparent nor must they tailor the 
means of implementing their policies.173  Courts upholding the bans have 
claimed to be concerned with lower courts second-guessing state authority 
during a public health emergency.174  The higher deference some courts have 
interpreted Jacobson as requiring effectively eliminates the judicial power to 
review legislative findings as Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt 
requires.175  
 
 163. See supra Section I.D. 
 164. See supra Section I.D.2.  
 165. See infra Sections II.A.1–2. 
 166. See infra Section II.A.1. 
 167. See infra Section II.A.2. 
 168. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 169. Id. at 177.   
 170. See David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in 
Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565, 2568 (2003) (“The conventional wisdom is that courts are 
ineffective as guardians of liberty when the general public is clamoring for security.”). 
 171. Lindsay F. Wiley & Stephen I. Vladeck, Coronavirus, Civil Liberties, and the Courts: The 
Case Against “Suspending” Judicial Review, 133 HARV. L. REV. F. 179, 182 (2020). 
 172. Id. at 195. 
 173. Id.  
 174. Abbott VI, 956 F.3d 696, 716 (5th Cir. 2020). 
 175. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310 (2016). 
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The states’ mitigation efforts to curb the spread of the virus—”flattening 
the curve”—required extending the duration of emergency orders. 176  As 
such, the suspension of judicial review could last an indeterminate amount of 
time.177  As of February 2021, a year after the pandemic broke out in the 
United States—and about a year after Ohio, Tennessee, Oklahoma, Alabama, 
Texas, and Arkansas issued executive orders postponing nonemergency 
surgeries—every state in the Union save one remained under some sort of 
public health emergency order.178  Texas repeatedly extended its initial 
emergency order declared on March 13, 2020.179  Indeed, the state of 
emergency lasted longer than an entire pregnancy carried to term.180  
Suspending ordinary judicial review supposedly for a temporary duration, 
but in reality for an indefinite duration, is the “exception [that] swallow[s] 
the rule.”181 
The Jacobson framework gives judges a mechanism to uphold bans they 
agree with politically.182  By assuming, as some courts have, that all abortions 
are elective rather than medically necessary, those courts have also been able 
to characterize abortion providers as demanding exceptional treatment.183  At 
 
 176. Abbott VI, 956 F.3d at 703; Wiley & Vladeck, supra note 171, at 187. 
 177. Wiley & Vladeck, supra note 171, at 187. 
 178. Each State’s COVID-19 Reopening and Reclosing Plans and Mask Requirements, NAT’L 
ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL’Y (Feb. 12, 2021), https://www.nashp.org/governors-prioritize-
health-for-all/ (maintaining continuously updated records of current state emergency orders across 
the United States).  Michigan was the only state no longer under a state of emergency because, in 
October 2020, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that Governor Gretchen Whitmer did not have 
the authority to unilaterally extend the state of emergency past the initial April 30, 2020, expiration 
date.  Jason Slotkin, Michigan Supreme Court Rules Against Governor’s Emergency Powers, NPR 
(Oct. 3, 2020, 3:14 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-
updates/2020/10/03/919891538/michigan-supreme-court-rules-against-governors-emergency-
powers.  
 179. 46 Tex. Reg. 889 (Feb. 5, 2021).  
 180. The state of emergency was still in effect as of February 2021, eleven months after 
Governor Abbott initially declared the emergency.  Id.  The Texas executive order challenged in 
Abbott was superseded by GA-15 on April 22, 2020, which contained an exception that allowed 
plaintiff abortion providers to continue performing abortions.  State Defendants’ Supplemental 
Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 8, Abbott III, 450 F. Supp. 3d 753 
(2020) (No. 1:20-cv-00323-LY), 2020 WL 2702292.  Texas officials abandoned the temporary 
abortion ban.  Id.  These restrictions that initiated the litigation have since been lifted but may return 
if cases of COVID-19 surge.  B. Jessie Hill, Essentially Elective: The Law and Ideology of 
Restricting Abortion During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 106 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 99, 110 (2020). 
 181. Wiley & Vladeck, supra note 171, at 187. 
 182. Id. at 191. 
 183. See Hill, supra note 180, at 117 (“Differential treatment of abortion providers is normalized 
by the stigma that permeates abortion provision, treats abortion services as outside of mainstream 
health care, and assumes almost all abortions are, by default, elective.  Thus, the providers’ requests 
to be allowed to make their own determinations whether a particular surgery for a particular patient 
qualified as essential and non-elective were cast by states, and some courts, as requests for ‘blanket 
exemption[s].’” (quoting Pre-Term Cleveland v. Att’y Gen., No. 20-3365, 2020 WL 1673310, at *3 
(6th Cir. Apr. 6, 2020))).  See also In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018, 1032 (8th Cir. 2020) 
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the same time, dissenting judges have criticized their colleagues for 
abdicating their impartial role when it comes to abortion-related cases.184  
Abortion occupies a unique position in constitutional analysis;185 few other 
medical procedures are attacked with such regularity and animosity.186  
For example, the Texas executive order resulted in two appeals to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.187  The first time, the 
Fifth Circuit held that the district court had not properly applied the Jacobson 
framework, which it interpreted as requiring that only those public health 
measures that have “no real or substantial relation to [the public health 
objectives], or is, beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights 
secured by the fundamental law” could be struck down and remanded.188  
When the district court again used the Jacobson framework to strike down 
the abortion ban, the Fifth Circuit issued a writ of mandamus to overturn that 
ruling—a form of relief appropriate “only in ‘exceptional circumstances 
amounting to a judicial usurpation of power or a clear abuse of 
discretion.’”189  As Judge Dennis notes in his dissent, other courts around the 
country have disagreed with the Fifth Circuit’s ruling, indicating that the 
district court could not have clearly abused its discretion.190  In its initial 
mandate, the Fifth Circuit even directed the district court to “inquire whether 
Texas has exploited the present crisis as a pretext to target abortion providers 
sub silentio.”191  The district court went on to find that the medical benefits 
of an abortion ban were limited, especially for medication abortions.192  
 
(characterizing the district court’s injunction of the executive order as applied to abortion providers 
as “effectively . . . ’a blanket exemption from a generally-applicable emergency public health 
measure . . . .’” (quoting Abbott II, 954 F.3d 772, 795 (5th Cir. 2020))).  
 184. Abbott VI, 956 F.3d 696, 725 (5th Cir. 2020) (Dennis, J., dissenting in part) (“I again echo 
the words of a colleague in dissent in a case now before the United States Supreme Court: ‘It is 
apparent that when abortion comes on stage it shadows the rule of settled judicial rules.’” (quoting 
June Med. Servs. LLC v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787, 816 (5th Cir. 2018) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting), 
rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020)). 
 185. Pre-Term Cleveland v. Att’y Gen., No. 20-3365, 2020 WL 1673310, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 6, 
2020) (Bush, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 186. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 187. Abbott VI, 956 F.3d at 703.  The Eighth Circuit adopted the same reasoning as the Fifth 
Circuit.  Rutledge, 956 F. 3d at 1025. 
 188. Abbott II, 954 F.3d 772, 784 (5th Cir. 2020) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905)). 
 189. Abbott VI, 956 F.3d at 707 (quoting In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc. 545 F.3d 304, 309 (5th 
Cir. 2008)). 
 190. Id. at 726 (Dennis, J., dissenting in part). 
 191. Abbott II, 954 F.3d at 792. 
 192. Abbott III, No. A-20-CV-323-LY, 2020 WL 1815587, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2020) 
(finding that “[p]roviding medication abortion does not require the use of any PPE”); id. at *5 
(finding that applying the executive order to abortions will not further the executive order’s goals 
because it “will not conserve PPE” and “will not conserve hospital resources” and finding that 
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Relying on these findings, the district court ruled that the executive order as 
applied to abortions did not bear a real or substantial relation to the public 
health emergency and thus remained unconstitutional even under the 
Jacobson framework.193 
Scholars have also argued that ordinary judicial review during a 
pandemic is necessary to cultivate a robust and appropriate response to both 
the continuing COVID-19 pandemic and other public health crises in the 
future.194  The threat of defending its policies in court under ordinary judicial 
scrutiny “force[s] the government to do its homework—to communicate not 
only the purpose of its actions, but also how the imposed restrictions actually 
relate to and further those purposes.”195  Under ordinary judicial review, 
courts would explain the states’ emergency response reasoning in a precise 
manner that would then have precedential value for future emergencies.196  
Such a requirement for transparent and reasoned pandemic policies from 
government officials could lead to more effective responses to public health 
crises in general.197 
2. Courts upholding abortion bans during the pandemic have 
applied Jacobson incorrectly as a descriptive matter because 
Jacobson did not articulate a new framework of constitutional 
analysis during times of emergencies. 
Jacobson has been invoked by every court that has reviewed a 
temporary abortion ban imposed by a state responding to the COVID-19 
 
“[p]hysicians are continuing to provide [other] obstetrical and gynecological procedures comparable 
to abortion in PPE use or time-sensitivity, based on their professional medical judgment”). 
 193. Id. at *6. 
 194. Wiley & Vladeck, supra note 171, at 194–95. 
 195. Lindsay F. Wiley & Steve Vladeck, COVID-19 Reinforces the Argument for “Regular” 
Judicial Review—Not Suspension of Civil Liberties—In Times of Crisis, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Apr. 
9, 2020), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/covid-19-reinforces-the-argument-for-regular-judicial-
review-not-suspension-of-civil-liberties-in-times-of-crisis/. 
 196. See Cole, supra note 170, at 2566 (“Because emergency measures frequently last well 
beyond the de facto end of the emergency, and because the wheels of justice move slowly, courts 
often have an opportunity to assess the validity of emergency measures after the emergency has 
passed, when passions have been reduced and reasoned judgment is more attainable.  In doing so, 
courts have at least sometimes been able to take advantage of hindsight to pronounce certain 
emergency measures invalid for infringing constitutional rights.  And because courts, unlike the 
political branches or the political culture more generally, must explain their reasons in a formal 
manner that then has precedential authority in future disputes, judicial decisions offer an opportunity 
to set the terms of the next crisis, even if they often come too late to be of much assistance in the 
immediate term.”). 
 197. See Amanda Mull, The Difference Between Feeling Safe and Being Safe, ATLANTIC (Oct. 
26, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/10/pandemic-safety-america/616858/ 
(noting that mixed messages from government officials fuel the general public’s misunderstanding 
of how to combat the coronavirus and can lead to greater frequency of risky behaviors). 
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pandemic.198  The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits 
both held that Jacobson did not impose a new framework of constitutional 
analysis but must instead be considered together with the standard for 
abortion-related challenges in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey and Whole Woman’s Health.199  On the other hand, 
the purported Jacobson test requires, according to the Fifth and Eighth 
Circuits, that district courts ask only whether the burdens imposed on 
abortion by a state’s executive order are substantially related to the public 
health emergency or whether the order’s burdens “‘beyond question’ exceed 
its benefits.”200  
The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits are correct.201  Jacobson does not 
establish a new standard of review.202  The Jacobson Court used a balancing 
test based on reasonableness of the state’s use of its police powers.203  In 
Abbott II, the Fifth Circuit interpreted this to mean that, in the context of 
abortion restrictions during a public health emergency, rationality review 
replaces heightened scrutiny.204  But the Jacobson Court’s definition of what 
is “reasonable” more closely mirrors heightened scrutiny than the Court’s 
later interpretation of what is “reasonable” under rationality review.205  Even 
if Jacobson does establish a new standard of review during a public health 
crisis, it is not a more deferential one.206  Jacobson was decided in 1905 two 
months before Lochner v. New York207—before the development of modern 
 
 198. See supra Section I.D. 
 199. Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913, 927 (6th Cir. 2020); Robinson v. Att’y Gen., 
957 F.3d 1171, 1182–83 (11th Cir. 2020). 
 200. Abbott II, 954 F.3d 772, 790 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 
11, 31 (1905)). 
 201. Slatery, 956 F.3d at 927; Robinson, 957 F.3d at 1182–83.  See also Hill, supra note 180, at 
108 (explaining that both the Jacobson standard and the undue burden test of Casey and Whole 
Woman’s Health require courts to balance the state’s interest against individual liberties); Wiley & 
Vladeck, supra note 171, at 190 (explaining that “Jacobson adopted a quintessential balancing 
test”). 
 202. Wiley & Vladeck, supra note 171, at 190. 
 203. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28. 
 204. Abbott II, 954 F.3d at 784–85; Abbott VI, 956 F.3d 696, 704–5 (5th Cir. 2020). 
 205. Compare Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28 (“[The] acknowledged power of a local community to 
protect itself against an epidemic threatening the safety of all[] might be exercised in particular 
circumstances and in reference to particular persons in such an arbitrary, unreasonable manner, or 
might go so far beyond what was reasonably required for the safety of the public, as to authorize or 
compel the courts to interfere for the protection of such persons.”), with Williamson v. Lee Optical, 
Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955) (“But the law need not be in every respect logically consistent 
with its aims to be constitutional.  It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it 
might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”). 
 206. Wiley & Vladeck, supra note 171, at 191. 
 207. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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constitutional scrutiny analysis and fundamental rights jurisprudence.208  As 
such, Jacobson cannot function as an exception to either subsequent 
jurisprudential tradition.209  The Jacobson rule acknowledges that state 
political branches must have leeway to enact reasonable policies in response 
to a public health crisis, but the rule “is not one of categorical deference to a 
state’s political decisions.”210  One scholar characterized Jacobson as 
imposing limitations on the state’s police power, rather than granting it 
deference.211  
The circumstances of a pandemic fit squarely into ordinary judicial 
scrutiny analysis.212  During a public health crisis, the government’s attempts 
to control the spread of virus and to diminish the level of emergency for the 
public become increasingly compelling.213  Indeed, the undue burden test for 
the abortion right is likewise proportional.214  The purported benefits of a 
state’s executive order banning abortions for a period of time during a health 
crisis will likely weigh more heavily than the purported benefits of other state 
laws implicating the abortion right.215  The undue burden test already takes 
the context of a pandemic into account.216 
Before the COVID-19 pandemic, Jacobson was cited often in the 
context of quarantined individuals suspected of carrying and potentially 
transmitting infectious diseases.217  In United States ex rel. Siegel v. Shinnick, 
 
 208. See id. at 64 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment protected the freedom of contract, 
beginning the since-rejected doctrine of economic due process); United States v. Carolene Products 
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting a need for heightened scrutiny for laws that “prejudice 
against discrete and insular minorities” and planting the seed of what would later become the 
familiar tiers of scrutiny). 
 209. Wiley & Vladeck, supra note 171, at 190. 
 210. Scott Burris, Rationality Review and the Politics of Public Health, 34 VILL. L. REV. 933, 
965 (1989). 
 211. Id.  See also James G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence O. Gostin, School Vaccination Requirements: 
Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90 KY. L.J. 831, 856–57 (2002) (finding that Jacobson 
imposed limits on the state’s police powers). 
 212. Wiley & Vladeck, supra note 171, at 188. 
 213. Id. at 189. 
 214. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992); Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016). 
 215. Hill, supra note 180, at 108 (“In the context of a pandemic, the Whole Woman’s Health 
standard for deciding whether a burden is ‘undue’ already allows courts to take into account the 
urgency and time-sensitivity of the state’s interests in preserving hospital capacity, maintaining the 
supply of PPE, and limiting contact.  The court must then balance those benefits against the burden 
on the individual’s right to access abortion . . . .”); Wiley & Vladeck, supra note 171, at 189 
(“[W]hat the coronavirus pandemic helps to make clear is that even widespread, mass incursions 
into civil liberties, such as statewide shelter-in-place orders, can generally survive modern 
constitutional scrutiny under most circumstances.”). 
 216. Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913, 927 (6th Cir. 2020). 
 217. See United States ex rel. Siegel v. Shinnick, 219 F. Supp. 789 (E.D.N.Y. 1963) (involving 
smallpox); Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579 (D.N.J. 2016) (involving Ebola); Reynolds v. 
McNichols, 488 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1973) (involving venereal disease). 
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a 1963 case about the mandatory quarantine of a woman returning from 
Sweden who was suspected of having contracted smallpox, the district court 
did not articulate which level of scrutiny it applied in upholding the federal 
quarantine order.218  The court did, however, inquire into the reasonableness 
of the health officials’ medical and scientific justifications for the woman’s 
quarantine.219  In Hickox v. Christie, the district court noted that “[a] 
restriction can be so arbitrary or overbroad as to be impermissible,” but it 
ultimately found no constitutional violation in the mandatory quarantine of a 
nurse returning to the United States from Ebola-stricken Sierra Leone.220  In 
Reynolds v. Nichols, the district court upheld the mandatory detention 
without bond of a sex worker suspected of having a venereal disease.221 
In all of these cases, the imposed quarantines were upheld by the 
courts.222  None of the courts, however, interpreted the state’s police powers 
as imposing such a deferential standard, effectively a suspension of judicial 
review, as the Abbott VI and In re Rutledge courts did.223  The Abbott II 
approach, endorsed by the Eighth Circuit in Rutledge, contended that: 
Jacobson instructs that all constitutional rights may be reasonably 
restricted to combat a public health emergency.  We could avoid 
applying Jacobson here only if the Supreme Court had specifically 
exempted abortion rights from its general rule.  It has never done 
so.  To the contrary, the Court has repeatedly cited Jacobson in 
abortion cases without once suggesting that abortion is the only 
right exempt from limitation during a public health emergency.224  
This characterization of Jacobson assumes that a challenge to an 
abortion restriction necessarily cannot stand under the Jacobson 
framework.225  The deference afforded to the political branches under this 
framework negates the inquiry into the rationale for the policy that Whole 
 
 218. Siegel, 219 F. Supp. at 791. 
 219. Id. (“The words cautioning against light use of isolation are indeed strong but the three 
medical men who testified manifestly shared a concern that was evident and real and reasoned. 
Their differentiation of the case of [the woman’s husband] was forthright, reasoned and 
circumstantially reassuring.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)). 
 220. Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 592–93. 
 221. Reynolds, 488 F.2d at 1383. 
 222. Siegel, 219 F. Supp. at 791; Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 592–94; id. at 603 (dismissing all 
federal causes of action for damages); Reynolds, 488 F.2d at 1383. 
 223. See Abbott VI, 956 F.3d 696, 723 (5th Cir. 2020) (concluding that an exceptional exercise 
of mandamus relief was warranted because the district court “usurp[ed] . . . the state’s power by 
second-guessing ‘the wisdom and efficacy of [its] emergency measures’”) (quoting Abbott II, 954 
F.3d 772, 795 (5th Cir. 2020)); In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018, 1027–28 (8th Cir. 2020) (following 
the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning and concluding that state emergency public health measures may only 
be struck down in rare instances where the measures are pretextual) (citing Abbott II, 954 F.3d at 
784–85 and Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905)). 
 224. Abbott II, 954 F.3d at 786. 
 225. Id.  
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Woman’s Health not only permits, but requires.226  The Jacobson Court itself, 
however, referred extensively to the thorough medical justifications for 
mandatory vaccines as a legitimate exercise of the police powers.227  
Professor Burris, over thirty years before the COVID-19 pandemic began, 
assumed that for cases in which heightened scrutiny normally applied—like 
cases implicating the abortion right228—heightened scrutiny would also apply 
in regards to state health actions.229  
As discussed in Section II.A.1, the Fifth Circuit cited Kansas v. 
Hendricks230 in its decision to uphold Texas’s temporary ban on abortion for 
the proposition that Jacobson relaxes ordinary constitutional scrutiny.231  
However, the Hendricks Court only held that constitutional rights of 
individuals may be restricted in civil contexts.232  It is also true, as the Fifth 
Circuit noted, that the Supreme Court has cited Jacobson in its abortion 
jurisprudence, but only for the proposition that constitutional rights are not 
absolute.233  Plaintiff abortion providers in Abbott II and Rutledge did not 
contend that the abortion right is absolute, only that, under the proportional 
standard of constitutional scrutiny articulated in Casey and Whole Woman’s 
Health, the state orders unconstitutionally restrict previability abortions.234 
In addition to misinterpreting what Jacobson required, the Fifth Circuit 
tipped the scale of the Jacobson test by directing the district court to evaluate 
whether the executive order had a “real or substantial relation” to the public 
health emergency as a whole, despite the fact that the challenge was an as-
 
 226. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016). 
 227. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 23–24. 
 228. Although the undue burden test is not the most traditional articulation of heightened 
scrutiny, Justice Breyer made clear in Whole Woman’s Health that the undue burden test is a higher 
form of scrutiny than rational basis review.  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 at 2309 (“[The Fifth 
Circuit’s interpretation of the second part of the undue burden test] is wrong to equate the judicial 
review applicable to the regulation of a constitutionally protected personal liberty with the less strict 
review applicable [in other contexts].”). 
 229. Burris, supra note 210, at 935. 
 230. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).  
 231. Abbott II, 954 F.3d 772, 785 (5th Cir. 2020). 
 232. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356–57. 
 233. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 
(1905)). 
 234. See Second Am. Compl. 4, Abbott III, No. A-20-CV-323-LY, 2020 WL 1815587 (W.D. 
Tex. Apr. 9, 2020) (demonstrating the proportional nature of abortion constitutional analysis by 
noting that “[t]he Texas Attorney General’s enforcement threats are a blatant effort to exploit a 
public health crisis to advance an extreme, anti-abortion agenda, without any benefit to the state in 
terms of preventing or resolving shortages of PPE or hospital capacity”) (emphasis added); 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order and/or 
Preliminary Injunction 26, Little Rock Fam. Plan. Servs. v. Rutledge, No. 4:19-cv-00449-KGB, 
2020 WL 2777815 (E.D. Ark. June 26, 2019) (acknowledging that the undue burden test is 
proportional in nature, but even so, “[p]laintiffs are likely to succeed [on the merits] because the 
burdens of the COVID-19 Abortion Ban far outweigh its purported benefits.”). 
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applied one.235  The district court never enjoined enforcement of the 
executive order in its entirety.236  Thus, in addition to using an improper 
mechanism for relief, the Fifth Circuit imposed the incorrect test on the 
district court.237  Of course the district court failed to abide by the “spirit of 
[the Abbott II] mandate,”238 because the spirit of the mandate demanded that 
the challenge could not stand under the articulated framework.239  For the 
reasons outlined above, this articulated framework was incorrect.240 
B. Orders restricting access to abortion during the COVID-19 
pandemic mirror past efforts to restrict the abortion right. 
After the Supreme Court decided Casey in 1992, anti-abortion 
advocates designed their strategy to restrict abortion as much as possible 
within the confines of Casey.241  These strategies reflect a “death by a 
thousand cuts” approach to curtailing the abortion right, making access to 
abortion so restricted as to effectively ban it.242  Anti-abortion legislation 
generally fall into one of three categories: (1) laws that impose delays on 
individuals seeking abortions;243 (2) laws that ban intact D&E abortions;244 
and (3) laws that impose “commonsense” health and safety measures that are 
actually unnecessary.245  Laws in this third category, often referred to as 
TRAP laws, make accessing abortion more difficult in the name of promoting 
 
 235. Abbott II, 954 F.3d at 787. 
 236. See Abbott III, 2020 WL 1815587, at *6 (“[B]ased on the court’s findings of fact, it is 
beyond question that the Executive Order’s burdens outweigh the order’s benefits as applied to 
Plaintiffs’ provision of (1) medication abortion; and (2) procedural abortions where, in the treating 
physician’s medical judgment, the patient would otherwise be denied access to abortion . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
 237. Abbott VI, 956 F.3d 696, 729 n.8 (5th Cir. 2020) (Dennis, J., dissenting in part).  
 238. Id. at 711 (majority opinion). 
 239. See Abbott II, 954 F.3d at 786 (suggesting that the only way this challenge could succeed 
is if Jacobson did not apply at all); Abbott VI, 956 F.3d at 724 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
majority simply disagrees with the district court’s decisions on matters that are squarely within its 
discretion.”). 
 240. See supra Sections II.A.1–2. 
 241. John A. Robertson, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt and the Future of Abortion 
Regulation, 7 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 623, 626 (2017). 
 242. Serena Mayeri, How Abortion Rights Will Die a Death by 1,000 Cuts, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/30/opinion/brett-kavanaugh-abortion-rights-roe-
casey.html. 
 243. Robertson, supra note 241, at 626.  These laws include informed consent requirements that 
play out as waiting periods and/or mandatory ultrasound laws.  Id.  
 244. Id. at 627.  This is the type of law that was at issue in Stenberg v. Carhart and Gonzales v. 
Carhart.  Id. 
 245. Id. at 627–28.  These laws impose restrictions on abortion clinics that are already subjected 
to ordinary medical clinic health and safety regulations.  Id.  The heightened requirements often 
lead to the closure of many abortion facilities.  Id.  
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health and safety, but have few actual medical benefits.246  These laws often 
lead to the closure of abortion facilities.247  Because the majority of women 
seeking abortions have low incomes, the barriers imposed by these laws also 
reduce the frequency of abortions by inflating the financial and emotional 
stress of obtaining one.248  State emergency orders responding to the COVID-
19 pandemic, and the judicial decisions upholding enforcement of the orders 
as applied to abortions, exemplify other TRAP laws imposed since the Casey 
decision.249  The temporary abortion bans resulting from the orders use delay 
tactics to essentially eliminate abortions altogether.250  The orders also 
impose restrictions on abortion facilities that appear neutral, but actually aim 
to restrict abortion as much as possible without sufficient medical benefits to 
warrant such restrictions.251 
1.  State emergency orders diminish the abortion right through 
delay, possibly to the point of obsolescence. 
Using the pandemic as a pretext to cut off abortion access is a political 
strategy often wielded by anti-abortion advocates.252  The goal of many 
TRAP laws is to regulate abortion facilities to the point of obsolescence.253  
Likewise, temporary state abortion bans render performance of abortions an 
impossibility without severe consequences for abortion providers.254  
Because of the exceptionally time-sensitive nature of pregnancy, temporary 
bans on abortion can serve as an outright ban.255  Although state emergency 
 
 246. Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE (Feb. 1, 2021), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/targeted-regulation-abortion-providers. 
 247. Robertson, supra note 241, at 627–28. 
 248. Jenna Jerman, Lori F. Frohwirth, Megan L. Kavanaugh, & Nakeisha Blades, Barriers to 
Abortion Care and Their Consequences for Patients Traveling for Services: Qualitative Findings 
from Two States, 49 PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 95, 95 (2017), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/journals/psrh/2017/04/barriers-abortion-care-and-their-consequences-
patients-traveling-services. 
 249. See infra Sections II.B.1–2. 
 250. See infra Section II.B.1. 
 251. See infra Section II.B.2. 
 252. Hill, supra note 180, at 100. 
 253. Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, supra note 246.  These laws include regulations 
applying to doctors’ offices including the width of hallways, the size of procedure rooms, and the 
distance of the office from a hospital.  Id.  It also includes licensing requirements like hospital 
admitting privileges requirements.  Id.  The Supreme Court ruled some of these requirements 
unconstitutional for posing an undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion in Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt.  136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016). 
 254. Abbott III, No. A-20-CV-323-LY, 2020 WL 1815587, at *2, *5 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2020). 
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orders postponing elective surgeries and procedures appear to neutrally target 
other types of medical procedures as well,256 the requirement that an abortion 
occur within a limited period of time, often by twenty to twenty-two weeks 
makes abortion unique.257 
Relying on the purported temporary nature of the state orders allows 
anti-abortion advocates to feign compliance with the Casey and Whole 
Woman’s Health undue burden test while impinging on a woman’s right to a 
previability abortion.258  The Fifth Circuit rejected the notion that the Texas 
executive order, as applied to abortions, was a categorical ban on abortion for 
the women who would reach twenty-two weeks LMP—the legal cutoff for 
obtaining an abortion in Texas—before the expiration of the executive 
order.259  To uphold the ban, the court had to find that it was not a categorical 
ban on abortion, as that would be a clear violation of Roe260 and Casey,261 and 
that abortions are “elective” or “non-essential” so as to fall within the 
purview of the state orders.262  The states defending their orders, therefore, 
characterized the bans as only temporary delays in abortion access.263  But 
this “temporary delay” characterization also fails the undue burden test of 
Casey and Whole Woman’s Health because the delay is significant enough to 
impose a substantial obstacle on a woman seeking an abortion.264  In some 
cases, the so-called “temporary” order pushed some pregnant patients past 
the twenty-two weeks LMP cutoff, making it illegal for them to obtain an 
abortion at all in Texas.265  Even if the bans are only temporary, the surge of 
people seeking abortions after the expiration of the temporary ban would lead 
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to even more delays.266  The fact of the matter is: mandating the delay of all 
abortions “completely removes the ability of the person affected to exercise 
her constitutional right to an abortion for as long as the order remains in 
place.”267 
2.  State emergency orders restricting abortion during the pandemic 
mirror TRAP laws because the emergency orders as applied to 
abortions have few, if any, medical benefits. 
State orders restricting abortions during an emergency health crisis are 
further similar to TRAP laws in that they provide few medical benefits yet 
purport to promote health and safety.268  In the cases of state emergency bans 
on non-essential medical procedures, including abortion, the health and 
safety benefits purportedly come in the form of fighting the spread of the 
pandemic.269  The orders, however, do not promote the health of either the 
individual pregnant patients or the general public at risk of contracting 
COVID-19.270 
The temporary bans on abortion do not promote the health of pregnant 
people.271  In Abbott II, the majority acknowledged the possibility of 
exploitation of the order to advance political anti-abortion goals,272 and the 
district court concluded accordingly that the order’s burdens beyond question 
outweighed its benefits as applied to both medication abortions and 
procedural abortions where delaying the procedure would push the patient 
past the state cutoff for obtaining an abortion.273  Health risks for both 
abortion and pregnancy increase as the pregnancy progresses.274  As noted by 
Professor B. Jessie Hill, “[p]regnancy progresses inevitably and relatively 
quickly . . . .”275  The longer a pregnancy progresses, the risk of 
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complications increases—as much as thirty-eight percent per week.276  
Women who passed the gestational age cutoff for either medication 
abortions, or D&E abortions during the ban would then have to obtain a 
riskier abortion at a later gestational stage once the order expired, subjecting 
themselves to higher risk of complications.277 
Abortion patients rarely need to be hospitalized,278 and women 
continuing their pregnancies are actually more likely to need and seek out 
care in a hospital.279  Pregnant women who could not obtain an abortion 
would also still need medical care during this period.280  The Texas order 
even permitted ordinary in-office visits to continue during the period the 
executive order was in effect.281  Additionally, the cost of an abortion 
increases with gestational age, putting more financial and emotional stress on 
patients prevented from obtaining an abortion for even a short period of 
time.282  This is an especially important factor considering that most women 
who seek abortions have low incomes.283  Some women unable to get an 
abortion in Texas were instead travelling out of state by car and airplane for 
both medication and procedure abortions.284  Travelling out of state during a 
pandemic is a health risk that public officials in every state have 
acknowledged,285 but it is not even an option for most women seeking 
abortions, most of whom are low-income and do not have the expendable 
funds to travel or potentially miss work, especially when some states have 
required out-of-state travelers to quarantine for two weeks.286 
Applying state orders temporarily banning elective procedures to 
abortion likewise does not promote the health justifications relating to the 
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COVID-19 pandemic.287  The Abbott III district court found that application 
of the executive order to abortions would not even help the state achieve its 
stated goal of preserving PPE or increasing hospital capacity.288  Abortions 
generally are performed in outpatient settings that use few resources; 
medication abortions are even self-administered at the patient’s home.289  As 
such, medication abortions do not require any PPE and, on the rare occasion 
that follow-ups are needed, they occur in outpatient settings, not hospitals.290  
Pre-procedure ultrasounds, required twenty-four hours before an abortion in 
Texas, use only minimal PPE and were exempt from the order as “office-
based visits without surgery or procedures” where “non-invasive diagnostic 
tests” would be performed.291  Women continuing their pregnancies are 
actually more likely to use more hospital resources than women who sought 
abortions.292  Women continuing their pregnancies would also need more in-
person care—and thus use more PPE—than women who received 
abortions.293  Women who would be unable to have an abortion due to the 
executive orders would require both PPE and hospital space when giving 
birth.294  
Abortion-related caselaw requires that the veracity of the purported 
medical benefits be sufficient to justify an imposition on a woman’s right to 
terminate her pregnancy.295  Emergency public health jurisprudence also 
takes the relevance of health benefits into account.296  As Professor Burris 
observed, “Jacobson was not based on the irrelevance of medical facts but 
on the overwhelming medical support for smallpox vaccination.”297  The 
medical justifications for applying state temporary bans on medical 
procedures to abortion clearly do not have the purported health benefits that 
anti-abortion advocates claim and must thus be struck down as 
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unconstitutional TRAP laws that infringe upon the right to terminate a 
pregnancy, even (and especially) during a pandemic.298 
C.  Looking Ahead: Abortion Regulation Further Into and After the 
Pandemic 
Courts abdicating their role as a check on the political branches is 
incredibly dangerous during a pandemic.299  Not only could a lack of judicial 
review passively condone infringement of civil rights in the present, but it 
could also affirmatively provide a blueprint for limiting civil rights in the 
future.300  Though, nearly a full year later, the Supreme Court vacated both 
the Sixth and the Fifth Circuits’ long-expired orders,301 the effects of the 
orders have already been felt.  In addition, vacating the orders as moot leaves 
open the possibility for future orders whose merits are substantively 
similar.302   
Some critics have argued that the COVID-19 pandemic may lead to 
strengthening of the abortion right.303  This view presumes that issues of 
gender and racial inequality that the pandemic has exacerbated will lead to a 
jurisprudential shift in defining the abortion right from one of substantive due 
process to equal protection.304  Presumably, this new framework would better 
allow the abortion right to stand undisturbed where states impose temporary 
abortion bans in the name of public safety.305  A classification based on 
pregnancy, though, is not the same as one based on sex or gender.306  Thus, 
under an equal protection analysis, the state orders would only need to 
survive rational basis review as applied to abortion restrictions.307  The undue 
burden test, born from substantive due process, on the other hand, is a form 
 
 298. See supra Section II.B.2. 
 299. Wiley & Vladeck, supra note 171, at 183. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Slatery v. Adams & Boyle, P.C., 141 S. Ct. 1262, 1263 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2021), vacating as 
moot 956 F.3d 913 (6th Cir. 2020). 
 302. Adam Lidgett, High Court Axes COVID-19 Texas, Tenn. Abortion Decisions, LAW360 (Jan 
25, 2021, 6:39 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1348088/high-court-axes-covid-19-texas-
tenn-abortion-decisions-?_ga=2.170492640.1323691957.1613013748-183638477.1560918015.  
The Sixth Circuit’s order prevented Tennessee officials from imposing a temporary abortion ban, 
and the Fifth’s required enforcement of Texas’s temporary ban.  Id.  
 303. See generally Ariane Frosh, Reproducing Equality: How COVID-19 Can Strengthen 
Abortion Rights, 68 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 80 (2020) (arguing that the COVID-19 pandemic 
may lead to a shift in the abortion jurisprudence where the right to terminate a pregnancy would be 
protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, rather than the Due Process 
Clause).  
 304. Id. at 83. 
 305. Id. at 84–85. 
 306. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1974). 
 307. Id. at 495. 
  
796 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:763 
of heightened scrutiny that provides a higher level of protection for the right 
to have an abortion.308   
Though such a drastic shift in the Supreme Court’s abortion 
jurisprudence is unlikely,309 there is historical evidence that a public health 
crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic may lead to a liberalization of abortion 
rights.310  After public health crises like rubella and the scare surrounding the 
Thalidomide drug, reproductive rights expanded.311  The COVID-19 
pandemic may spark the public’s desire to more voraciously protect abortion 
rights and other civil liberties.312  One area where this liberalization is likely 
to take place in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic—and, indeed, 
already has—is in the in-person requirement for obtaining abortion-inducing 
medication.313  Abortion providers in Maryland were initially successful in 
obtaining an injunction regarding the in-person visits required to receive a 
medication abortion.314  Even after the Supreme Court subsequently stayed 
the injunction, the FDA decided not to enforce the in-person requirements of 
its own volition.315  That is not the end of the story, however, as the attorneys 
general for Indiana, Louisiana, Alabama, Arkansas, Idaho, Kentucky, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, and Oklahoma have asked the Fourth 
Circuit to let them intervene in the litigation to defend the in-person 
requirements.316  In any event, if in-person requirements prove unnecessary 
and unduly burdensome during a pandemic, perhaps support for eliminating 
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the requirements will gain traction as telemedicine expands beyond the 
pandemic.317 
More likely, however, is the probability that the understanding of the 
abortion right during the COVID-19 pandemic could provide a blueprint for 
using state emergency police powers to curtail the right in the future.318  
Though the litigation surrounding state emergency orders delaying some 
medical procedures has seemingly died down, new surges of coronavirus 
infections may stir up additional litigation.319  If anti-choice advocates 
succeed, the suspension of judicial review model, adopted by some courts as 
a result their interpretation of Jacobson, might allow the expansion of the 
states’ police powers to operate as a mechanism to curtail access to abortion 
(and other civil liberties) for indefinite periods of time.320  The suspension of 
judicial review model also prevents the development of strong caselaw 
around constitutional issues during a public health emergency.321 
III. CONCLUSION  
States are perfectly within their rights to exercise their police powers to 
protect the health and safety of the public during the COVID-19 pandemic.322  
Some emergency measures chosen by the states may infringe on citizens’ 
constitutional rights—like the right to terminate a pregnancy—but such 
measures must be reasonable.323  In analyzing whether a state 
unconstitutionally banned access to abortion procedures through state orders 
postponing all elective or non-essential procedures, courts misapplied 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts normatively and descriptively.324  The functional 
bans on abortion—even if only temporary—are merely the latest attempt by 
anti-abortion advocates to restrict abortion to the point of obsolescence.325  
As the pandemic continues ravaging the country, we will likely continue to 
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see similar attacks on abortion.326  Without a restructuring of public 
emergency jurisprudence and a reframing of the abortion right, the right to 
an abortion remains extremely vulnerable during the COVID-19 pandemic—
and, perhaps, beyond it.327 
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